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also with Italy and the Benelux countries. This process began 
with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1950), 
was further expanded as the EEC (1957), continued with the 
EC, and was finally developed into the EU. Germany, which 
had brought untold suffering to Europe and the rest of the 
world through two world wars in the 20th century through its 
attempts to dominate Europe, was to be prevented from try-
ing to do so again. It is essential to remember that Germany 
was still divided at this time: the three Western powers con-
trolled West Germany, which from the beginning had been 
part of the ECSC as well as the EEC/EC/EU; whereas the 
Soviet Union controlled the German Democratic Republic. 
Clearly, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty signatories were not 
only using Germany to direct actions against each other, they 
were also there to keep the country under control.
This post-war constellation was settled with the end of the 
East-West conflict between 1989 and 1991: a revived and 
united Germany now stood in the midst of Europe as if it had 
won the Cold War. Eric Hujer, the Swiss journalist, described 
the new situation in the following manner: “Germany is no 
longer under guardianship, nor is the country now existen-
tially dependent on the protection of its allies.” He viewed 
the upheavals of 1989 to 1991 as having led to a ‘revised 
post-war order’. Accordingly, “Russia and the victorious al-
lied powers of France and Britain are no longer as important 
as they once were. In contrast, Germany is one of the win-
ners of this new world order. Germany no longer draws its 
strength solely from its economic power, as it did during the 
Cold War. Along with a handful of other countries, Germany 
now has the necessary strength to influence international 
politics. Reunified Germany has grown into a major power, 
and the country is now beginning to use the opportunities 
that have accompanied this position.”1 This was written be-
fore the outbreak of the financial and economic crises; now 
Germany really has started influencing superpower politics.
Since the outbreak of the world financial and economic crises, the continued effects of which we are still grappling with, 
academics, politicians and journalists have been absorbed by the issue of the euro and the fate of the European Union. At 
the same time, despite various EU summits, no viable, sustainable solution has been found. This has been confounded by 
the enforcement of neoliberalism over recent decades. However, without a fundamental break from neoliberalism as a way 
of thinking and acting, as well as its institutional form, it is unlikely that a solution to these crises will ever be found.
Erhard CromE
GErmany in EuropE
a nEw rolE aftEr thE finanCial Crisis?
The financial crisis that began in 2008 led to an economic cri-
sis. This was then followed by a crisis of the euro because the 
‘bailout’ of the banks, which secured the excess financial cap-
ital belonging to the speculators, led to a massive expansion 
in national debt. In other words, the bailout transferred fictive 
debt that had been created through speculation into real debt 
taken on by the state. Taxpayers were then expected to repay 
this debt, even if this meant reducing wages and pensions in 
order to do so. Furthermore, although rescuing excess capital 
in this manner enabled it to survive the crisis, there were few 
appropriate investment opportunities in the ‘real economy’. 
Consequently, speculators began targeting the national econ-
omies of weaker EU states. These problems can be traced 
back to mistakes made during the foundation of the EU: com-
munitising the freedom of capital instead of economic, fiscal 
and social policies; and establishing the euro as a common 
currency without ensuring that the countries involved were 
jointly responsible for it. Seen in this light, it is clear that the 
financial crisis has merely brought to the fore problems that 
were already inherent within the EU. The victims of these de-
velopments are primarily the people of Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal, Spain and Italy, who face ever-increasing cuts in social 
spending, euphemistically known as ‘austerity measures’ in 
the media. This process is drawing more and more countries 
away from an economic crisis and towards a social crisis that 
will eventually end in a crisis of political representation.
thE Crisis, thE Eu and GErmany
Although the crisis has clearly tested the EU as an institution, 
it also calls the original purpose of the EU into question. The 
initial idea of the EU – as proposed by people such as Jean 
Monnet and Robert Schuman – was to establish peace in Eu-
rope through Germany’s containment. This was to be done 
by institutionalising Germany’s shared interests at the su-
pranational level, not only together with those of France, but 
2Since reunification, German foreign policy has gradually be-
come more independent. The basic principle of German for-
eign policy, especially in West Germany until 1989, used to be 
the avoidance of unilateral action. Germany tended to form 
alliances and act as part of international organisations, such 
as the European Union, NATO or the UN. An alignment with 
Western foreign policy was viewed as particularly important. 
In response to the events of 11 September 2001, the German 
Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, announced Germany’s “un-
limited solidarity” with the US. In cases where differences 
existed between US or French policy, German foreign policy 
always opted for one of the two positions. An example of 
this is the way in which the Schröder government in 2003 
positioned itself demonstratively on the side of France and re-
fused to participate in the US-Iraq war; this was a time during 
which the Bush administration was still searching for ‘willing’ 
partners. However, when Germany abstained from UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1973 (of 17 March 2011) – a resolution 
that opened the path for Western countries to begin war in 
Libya – this marked the first time that Germany had not voted 
with the US, France or Britain; instead, Germany sided with 
China, Russia, India and Brazil – the emerging powers of the 
21st century. At the level of symbolic politics, this sent a sig-
nal to the former Western powers, as well as Germany’s long-
time allies in NATO and the EU, that from now on Germany 
would only agree with them when it was in its own interests 
to do so. In other words, since 2011, German interests – as 
reflected in international politics – are no longer merely based 
on the country’s ‘commitments to an alliance’; nor are these 
interests dictated by other nations or institutions.
This leads us to the question as to whether this also ap-
plies to German EU policy. In the past, German chancellors 
such as Adenauer, Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl considered Eu-
ropean integration as essential to the country’s raison d’être: 
European integration was both a means to an aim, and an 
aim in itself. However, this stance is no longer apparent from 
German policies on debt. Rather, the German perspective 
seems to view the EU as a means of pursuing a new level of 
international standing. Germany is certainly in no position to 
negotiate with China on an equal footing; yet it could do so if 
German policy were backed by the support of the EU. Clear-
ly, the collapse of US unilateralism has not only provided op-
portunities for ‘new’ powers such as China or India and ‘old’ 
powers such as Russia; it has also opened up possibilities 
for certain EU countries, including the ‘old’ military powers 
such as France and the UK (exemplified by their participation 
in the war in Libya), as well as Germany as an independent 
political and economic power with its own expanding global 
interests.
a nEw dEbatE on GErman hEGEmony
The magazine Merkur opened 2012 with an article entitled 
‘Reluctant hegemony’. The author, Christoph Schönberger, 
professor of public law at the University of Konstanz, de-
scribed the changed situation caused by the financial crisis 
in the following manner: “Since the European sovereign 
debt crisis, none of the tedious and artificial constructions 
developed by Western Europe after 1945, which were later 
strengthened and deepened as part of the reunified conti-
nent after 1989, can be taken for granted any longer. Germa-
ny is particularly affected by such fundamental uncertainties, 
especially because the amazing resurgence of Germany after 
the Second World War was inextricably linked to the coun-
try’s close integration into the network of European states. 
At the same time, it is also clearer than ever that Germany 
has now become the hegemonic power in Europe. Germany 
has to lead [...].”2 However, this comment is followed by an 
almost obligatory reference to the alleged incompetence of 
the German political leadership: “German hegemony within 
the European Union comes with huge obligations, which the 
Federal Republic is unable to adequately fulfil. This is caused 
by the unfortunate manner in which intellectual and institu-
tional factors are linked.”3
The same could also be said about the periods after 1914 
and 1939; but Schönberger would probably reject such com-
parisons. On the other hand, perhaps it really is Germany’s 
destiny to feel called to hegemony, only to fail in the end. 
Towards the end of his article, Schönberger also recognises 
this analogy: “Hegemony in the European Union calls on 
the German elite and the German public to act in a manner 
that Germany’s location at the heart of Europe has always 
demanded. Germany must set aside its national introversion 
and instead attentively study, observe and influence its Euro-
pean neighbours, while ensuring German interests still take 
those of its partners into account. In short, Germany needs 
to provide a vision for Europe as a whole.” Ultimately, “Ger-
many cannot let itself develop an intellectual and institutional 
direction that is purely aimed at managing its own vested 
interests [...]. Instead Germany must take on the burden of 
hegemony, even if this rests painfully on its shoulders.”4
Schönberger is not referring to the profit that German capi-
tal has drawn from the euro, or to the manner in which the 
country has been integrated into the EU over the last twenty 
years; he is referring to the political challenges associated 
with hegemony. Ulrike Guérot, who has run the Berlin of-
fice of the European Council on Foreign Relations since 
2007, commented on Wolfgang Schäuble’s 2012 speech in 
Aachen in acceptance of the Charlemagne Prize in a similar 
way: “Europe is becoming more German; Germany is he-
gemonic in Europe. This need not be a bad thing”, and con-
cluded that “Germany must now demonstrate foresight and 
leadership qualities. […] The euro has led Germany to be-
come a world power. Nevertheless, the country is squander-
ing these powers, because it does not understand – or does 
not wish to understand – that the essence of the euro is po-
litical.”5 Around the same time, the Tagesspiegel expressed 
the tensions between the goal of hegemony and the fear of 
failure: “There is a great fear of German hegemony in Europe, 
yet this is accompanied by huge expectations about what 
Berlin could achieve, and these expectations are certainly 
not solely financial in nature. Everyone expects Germany to 
act and to take on not only a political leadership role but also 
financial responsibility for Europe.”6
These opinions demonstrate three points: 1) that twenty 
years after reunification, German hegemony in Europe is 
viewed as completely normal; 2) that Germany’s economic 
power is seen as the basis of its hegemonic position, but the 
challenge of hegemony itself is viewed as having a political 
aspect; and (3) that there is consensus that the financial and 
economic crises have brought about change that has placed 
Germany in the role of a dominant political power. However, 
some people might object to these points and argue that 
there are also other voices being expressed in Germany. Be 
this as it may, these opinions form part of a way of thinking 
that is obviously held by important sections of the conserva-
tive, German bourgeoisie, which stands particularly close to 
2 3
the structures of political decision-making in the country. In 
2011 Bernd Ulrich, deputy editor and head of politics at the 
Hamburg newspaper Die Zeit, wrote that “Germany is a mid-
dle power: it is stronger than most European countries, but 
not as strong as the US or the China of today.” He continued: 
“Up until and after reunification, it was not in Germany’s in-
terests to demonstrate its strength as this might have reig-
nited historical reservations. Every German government has 
maintained this same maxim, including the present one. But 
this policy no longer works by itself. During the financial cri-
sis, and especially since the European currency and debt cri-
sis, Germany – as the healthiest economic power – has been 
expected to demonstrate leadership. Suddenly Germany 
was no longer able to camouflage its own strength. This in 
turn led to a complete change in Germany’s role: the ‘villain 
of world history’ was now ‘everybody’s darling’. Germany is 
for Europe what the United States has been for the world for 
a long time – a nation that is expected to take care of every-
thing, and one that everyone can insult afterwards – both a 
saviour and an imperialist.” Two points are interesting here: 
not only is Germany now being compared to the US, it also 
seems that imperialism is no longer seen as such a bad thing.
In Internationale Politik in late 2011, Hans Kundnani, from 
the European Council on Foreign Relations (London), stated 
that “The euro crisis has spawned a new, decisive Federal 
Republic. Germany, a former civil power, is now a geo-eco-
nomic power.” In his further analysis, Kundnani refers to the 
Middle East (the Libya resolution was still fresh) and argues 
that there is “growing tension between Germany’s econom-
ic and political interests”. He continues by stating that “The 
quest for protection is no longer as important as it once was: 
economic interests now primarily define national interests. 
Nevertheless, Germany will not completely separate itself 
from the West. The country will continue to look to NATO (for 
security) and the EU (for markets). Germany is well placed 
in the geo-political landscape, but the German economy 
might outgrow its surroundings. Germany’s neighbours may 
no longer be able to keep up; but even so, Germany is still 
not large enough to become hegemonic. This leads the Ger-
man question to be reframed along geo-economic lines.”8 
Although compared with other authors, Kundnani questions 
more strongly Germany’s ability to assume a hegemonic 
role, his definition of Germany as a ‘geo-economic power’ 
is conceptually significant. Germany is a power with inter-
ests on the global market that target the world economy and 
are primarily supported in economic terms. Moreover, Ger-
many’s regional integration into Europe, its involvement in 
the EU, its membership of NATO, its stance at the UN and 
other international organisations, as well as its international 
politics in a diplomatic sense, all reflect these economic in-
terests.
EConomiC dEvElopmEnts
According to the latest International Monetary Fund figures 
for 2011 (dated April 2012), global gross domestic product 
had a nominal total volume of 69.66 trillion US dollars. Ac-
cordingly, global GDP increased by 3.85 per cent over 2010. 
However, this growth continued to be distributed unevenly: 
China’s GDP grew by 9.24 per cent; India’s by 7.24 per cent; 
Russia’s by 4.30 per cent; and Brazil’s by 2.73 per cent; while 
GDP in the United States grew by 1.74 per cent, and the EU 
by 1.62 per cent. The EU itself has a GDP of 17.58 trillion US 
dollars, making it the largest economy in the world. Within 
the EU, Germany’s nominal GDP of 3.58 trillion US dollars in 
2011 made up about one-fifth of total EU GDP.9
In 2011, German foreign trade revenues reached a volume 
of 1.96 trillion euros; exports for the first time passed the 1 
trillion euro mark, and the trade surplus stood at 158,086.3 
billion euros.10 In 2010, sales totalled 1.77 trillion euros and 
the export surplus amounted to 153,333.3 billion euro.11 As 
a result, the German economy continues to be the second-
largest exporter in the world. (Since 2005, Germany has been 
second to China: the calculation of China’s export revenues 
and balances needs to include those of the People’s Repub-
lic, Hong Kong and Macau, which are often left out of many 
statistics). As we can see, the new debate about Germany’s 
international standing is actually based on hard economics.
According to figures released since the financial crisis, 
German GDP in 2008 increased by 1.1 per cent over the pre-
vious year; in 2009 it declined by 5.1 per cent. The German 
economy grew in 2010 and 2011 by 3.7 and 3.0 per cent 
respectively. Falling global demand in 2009 led to a mas-
sive slump in German exports of 18.4 per cent. However, by 
2010, German exports had increased by 18.5 per cent; they 
increased again in 2011, by 11.4 per cent. This means that 
in 2011, German exports had even surpassed their previ-
ous peak level, which was achieved in 2008.12 In 2010, 79 
per cent of the German trade surplus consisted of exports to 
other EU countries; 55.22 per cent of these were exports to 
the euro area.13 In 2011, 75.6 per cent of the German trade 
surplus resulted from trade with the EU, with 50.83 per cent 
of this from trade with the euro area.14
It would be useful at this point to examine more closely 
the differences within the EU. Comparing the nominal GDP 
performance of EU countries from 2007 and 2011 (the cal-
culation of which usually includes income and revenues 
from the ‘financial industry’), the German share of EU GDP 
increased from 19.79 to 20.35 per cent; France’s share in-
creased from 14.89 to 15.79 per cent; whereas Italy’s and 
Spain’s shares remained relatively unchanged at about 12.5 
and 8.5 per cent respectively. On the other hand, the UK’s 
share of EU GDP dropped from 16.66 per cent to 13.75 per 
cent, and Ireland’s share shrunk from 1.55 per cent to 1.24 
per cent. Accordingly, the UK’s and Ireland’s shares of the 
EU’s economic performance both decreased by about a fifth. 
This demonstrates that economies which are strongly based 
on the real economy have more favourably weathered the 
crisis than those which specialise in ‘financial products’ and, 
in other words, have provided centre-stage for speculation.
thE politiCal ConsEquEnCEs
The clear result of German export surpluses is debt in other 
EU countries. Given the ‘austerity measures’ that are being 
implemented in debtor countries, the question arises as to 
whether Germany’s customers are being slaughtered to save 
the euro (for example, Greece), and whether Germany is con-
sequently destroying its own markets. This situation cannot 
be explained simply in terms of the influence of the ‘financial 
markets’ on politics. It has more to do with the fact that the 
euro is the second-most important currency in the world, 
and as such directly competes and conflicts with the US dol-
lar. As the euro provides the basis for Germany’s position in 
the world economy, and thus its position in the world today, 
priority is placed on rescuing and stabilising the euro, even 
if this is done at the expense of the social position and sta-
bility of other EU countries. This highlights the tensions be-
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tween Germany’s interests as a global geo-economic power 
and the EU as an integrated network of states, peoples and 
regions. Whereas from the perspective of EU integration, 
different levels of development within the EU ought to be 
reduced; from the perspective of German global interests, 
these differences are irrelevant provided they do not interfere 
with the German export economy.
The reductions in the share of other EU countries and the 
euro area as a whole in Germany’s export surplus from 2010 
to 2011 seems to confirm this: German profits from distant 
world trade even increase when trade reduces with the EU. 
This situation leads to the development of a new periphery, 
not only in the globalised world, but also within Europe: Ger-
many and a number of other countries belong to the ‘hard’ 
euro area and constitute the centre of the EU, whereas debt-
or countries in the Mediterranean and those on the ‘edge’ of 
the EU (Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain) form the 
ailing periphery. The question is, however, whether the EU 
as an institution based on integration can cope with this situ-
ation in the long-term. In the summer of 2012, Hans Kund-
nani, who is also quoted above, wrote: “Germany’s growing 
power, and France’s relative weakness, has enabled Berlin to 
impose its preferences on the euro area and the EU.” Despite 
this, “the Europe that is developing from the crisis will be less 
of a German Europe than a chaotic Europe”.15
At the same time, the EU is not only currently character-
ised by the development of an EU-wide political structure 
and an ‘elite’; linkage between capital in Europe also contin-
ues to grow. At the same time, however, nationally organised 
‘state-monopolistic complexes’ of power still exist, mean-
ing that different stakeholders can be identified within the 
EU including: German capital and the German government; 
French capital and the French government; and British capi-
tal and the British government (with its special interests in 
terms of London as a ‘financial centre’). On the one hand, 
this means that the institutionalisation of the EU and the 
communitisation of its policies are likely to continue, but on 
the other hand, power shifts are occurring that relate to spe-
cific nation states. Consequently, it is still analytically useful – 
despite EU integration – to speak of the German tendency to 
strive for dominance.
However, doing so poses the ‘German question’ once 
again. Germany is the main beneficiary of the euro, but it 
would also bear the brunt of the currency’s collapse. Despite 
this, the euro should not be rescued through hegemony, but 
through cooperation. The EU, in its institutional form since 
1950, has been fundamentally opposed to hegemony: any 
attempt to assert informal hegemony can only fail due to the 
EU’s institutional regulations. If the purpose of the EU was 
to provide a space for states to resolve conflicts peacefully 
and through statutory provisions, instead of through trench 
warfare, this purpose surely needs to be emphasised now. 
Although the strong German position within the EU has re-
mained relatively unchallenged because the former French 
president, Nicolas Sarkozy, followed Chancellor Angela Mer-
kel’s policies without much opposition, the current French 
president, Francois Hollande, liaises with the Spanish and 
the Italian prime ministers and now occupies a compara-
tively strong position within EU institutions; this currently 
provides a balance to Germany. Germany has no interest in 
a weak euro, and no interest in a collapse of the common 
currency or the EU. Confronted with any of these situations, 
Germany’s strong export economy and fiscal positions 
would ultimately be of little use. The EU was not constructed 
for the hegemony of any particular country, and any move 
towards hegemony is contrary to its basic principles.
As such, the battle for the future of the European Union is 
taking place on three levels: (1) struggles continue between 
labour and capital, between people in dependent employ-
ment and the owners of capital, but these struggles are being 
exacerbated by the economic and financial crises; (2) there 
are conflicts between the various ‘state-monopolistic com-
plexes’; and (3) conflict also exists between German hegem-
onic policies and the EU’s institutional arrangements. The 
different struggles that are taking place at these three levels 
are interwoven and influence each other.
The results of these struggles will largely decide the fate 
of Europe. How these struggles will end is still unclear, at 
least in the sense that the current ‘objective conditions’ 
mean that various outcomes are possible. The political skills 
of the actors involved will dictate how things will turn out 
in the end. Importantly, these actors are not only govern-
ments and the bureaucratic administration in Brussels, but 
also people throughout the EU who are organised in politi-
cal movements and parties, trade unions and organisations; 
and their courage to act. If the euro were to collapse, then 
this would be due to those in power and government – the 
‘European elite’ – having created conditions that they were 
no longer able to control. However, this would also place us 
in a fundamentally different situation from the one we find 
ourselves in today.
Erhard Crome works at the Institute for Critical Social Analysis  
of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.
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